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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3556 
___________ 
 
SOLOMON JOHNSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BRIAN V. COLEMAN, WARDEN; DR. HERBICK, MEDICAL DIRECTOR; 
ROBERT TRETINIK, R.N. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-01376) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joy Flowers Conti 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 29, 2012 
 
 Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: December 13, 2012 ) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION 
_________________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 Solomon Johnson appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint.  Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s order. 
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I. 
 In 2008, Johnson filed a civil rights complaint in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  In the complaint, he alleged that Defendants 
Dr. Herbick, Brian Coleman, and Robert Tretinik were deliberately indifferent to his 
serious medical condition in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution.   
The medical condition from which Johnson suffers is known as deep vein 
thrombosis.  Prior to his incarceration, he was given a treatment plan consisting of 
“lifetime annual ultrasound therapy in conjunction with blood thinners . . . .”  Johnson 
received this treatment while imprisoned at the State Correctional Institution at Albion in 
September 2007.  After being transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Fayette, 
he requested his annual treatment for 2008.  Herbick, the Medical Director, refused to 
continue with the yearly ultrasound therapy, telling Johnson that ultrasound therapy was 
only necessary if he was having pain.  Herbick also arranged for Johnson to consult with 
a vascular surgeon via videoconference, and it appears that the vascular surgeon agreed 
with Herbick’s decision to forego Johnson’s annual ultrasound therapy. 
 At some point in 2009, Johnson developed pain and a lump in his left leg.  After 
he expressed concern that he was experiencing clotting in his legs, he was visited by 
medical personnel.  It appears that, during his medical examination, Johnson received 
anti-inflammatory medicine and an X-ray, which came out negative for signs of the lump.  
Because Johnson was unable to consult the vascular surgeon again or receive ultrasound 
therapy, he filed a grievance regarding his treatment.  Tretinik, the Chief Health Care 
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Administrator, responded to Johnson’s grievance with a letter reiterating the treatment 
that Johnson received. 
 According to Johnson’s complaint, Herbick demonstrated deliberate indifference 
to Johnson’s serious medical condition by failing to comply with Johnson’s pre-
incarceration medical treatment plan and failing to consult the vascular surgeon after 
Johnson complained of the lump and pain in his left leg.  Johnson also claimed that his 
grievance put Tretinik and Coleman, the Warden, on notice that he suffered from a 
serious medical condition and was not receiving adequate medical treatment in the 
prison. 
The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing Johnson’s complaint against all 
three defendants, reasoning that (1) Johnson’s claim against Herbick was time-barred; (2) 
Johnson failed to allege facts establishing that Herbick acted with deliberate indifference; 
and (3) Johnson failed to allege facts establishing that Coleman and Tretinik had actual 
knowledge that Johnson was not receiving adequate medical treatment.  Despite 
Johnson’s objections to the Report and Recommendation, the District Court agreed 
substantially with the Magistrate Judge and issued a memorandum order dismissing 
Johnson’s complaint.  Johnson timely appealed to this Court. 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a 
district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is plenary.  
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).  To survive a motion to 
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dismiss, a plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The complaint must contain “factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s are] 
liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).  We may summarily affirm a judgment of the District Court 
on any basis supported by the record if the appeal does not raise a substantial question.  
See I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v. Bledsoe
A. 
, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment, prison officials are required to provide basic medical treatment to inmates.  
Dismissal of the claim against Herbick 
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  In order to establish a constitutional 
violation, a prisoner must show that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the 
prisoner’s serious medical needs.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  A finding 
of deliberate indifference requires proof of subjective knowledge, not objective 
knowledge, “meaning that the official must actually be aware of the existence of the 
excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the official should have been aware.”  Beers-
Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001).  Deference is given to prison 
medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of patients, and courts “disavow any 
attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . . 
(which) remains a question of sound professional judgment.”  Inmates of Allegheny 
Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Bowring v. Godwin, 551 
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F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)).  We have found deliberate indifference where a prison 
official: “(1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to 
provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) 
prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended treatment.”  Rouse, 182 F.3d 
at 197 (citing Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993)).  However, we have 
found that “no claim is stated when a doctor disagrees with the professional judgment of 
another doctor.”  White v. Napoleon
The District Court properly dismissed Johnson’s claim for failure to allege facts 
establishing that Herbick knew of and ignored a risk to Johnson’s health.  Although 
Johnson alleged a serious medical condition, he did not allege that Herbick denied or 
delayed necessary medical treatments.  Instead, Johnson received treatment for his 
condition in accordance with Herbick’s treatment plan, which Herbick apparently 
developed via videoconference consultation with a vascular surgeon.  It thus appears that 
Johnson’s claim is fundamentally about his concern that Herbick’s treatment plan 
differed from the treatment Johnson received prior to his incarceration at SCI-Fayette.  
Because Johnson’s complaint alleged only a disagreement with the course of treatment he 
received, we agree with the District Court that Johnson failed to state a claim that 
Herbick was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition. 
, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990). 
B. 
The District Court properly dismissed Johnson’s claims against Tretinik and 
Coleman for their roles as administrators.  “If a prisoner is under the care of medical 
Dismissal of the claim against Tretinik and Coleman  
6 
 
experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the 
prisoner is in capable hands.”  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).  Thus, 
“absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants 
are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be 
chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.”  
Id.  Because Tretinik’s only alleged role was responding to Johnson’s administrative 
complaint, we conclude that the District Court properly applied Spruill
The District Court also properly dismissed Johnson’s claim against Coleman.  “An 
individual government defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement 
in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of 
respondeat superior.”  
 when it dismissed 
Johnson’s claim against Tretinik. 
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Rode v. Dellarciprete
Accordingly, this appeal presents us with no substantial question, and we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  
, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).  Here, because Johnson did 
not allege that Coleman had any personal involvement in the alleged underlying 
wrongdoing, he failed to state a claim against Coleman. 
See 3rd Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
